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Lindblom v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 120 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 40, 90 P.3d 1283
(June 10, 2004)1
JUDGMENT – APPEAL and ERROR
Disposition/Outcome
District court’s order setting aside default judgment against hotel-Respondent
affirmed. An order setting aside a default judgment was appealable as a special order under
Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure (NRAP) 3A(b)(2)2. The trial court’s determination of
excusable neglect under Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 60(b)(2)3 was not a proper
basis upon which to grant relief from the default judgment, but a trial court’s exercise of
discretion to deny or grant a motion to set aside a default judgment under NRCP 60(b)(1) on
the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect will not be disturbed
upon appeal, absent an abuse of discretion. The default judgment should have been rendered
void under NRCP 60(b)(3) for Appellant’s failure to provide Respondent with the three-days’
written notice of hearings on the application for default judgment required under NRCP
55(b)(2).4 The hotel’s participation in pre-suit negotiations equated to an “appearance” under
NRCP 55(b)(2) and the three-days’ written notice under NRCP 55(b)(2) was required when
pre-suit interactions evinced a clear intent to appear and defend.5
Factual and Procedural History
The Appellant, Karen Lindblom, was injured on June 30, 2000 while a guest at the
Wellesley Inn and Suites Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. The Respondent, Prime Hospitality
Corporation (Prime), owned the hotel facility. During the year following the accident,
Lindblom and Prime’s liability insurer engaged in extensive discussions and negotiations
concerning her claim for negligence and damages. Several settlement offers were exchanged
and rejected. Lindblom filed a personal injury action against Prime on July 25, 2001, and
effected service on July 27, 2001.
Prime timely forwarded the summons and complaint to their insurer. The insurer did
not act upon them because they either did not receive the documents or through oversight.
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Nev. R. App. Pro. 3A(b)(2) states: An appeal may be taken: …
(2) From an order granting or refusing a new trial, or granting or refusing to grant or dissolving or
refusing to dissolve an injunction, or appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver, or vacating or
refusing to vacate an order appointing a receiver, or dissolving or refusing to dissolve an
attachment, or changing or refusing to change the place of trial, or from any order entered in a
proceeding that did not arise in a juvenile court that finally establishes or alters the custody of
minor children, and from any special order made after final judgment except an order granting a
motion filed and served within sixty (60) days following entry of a default judgment, setting aside
the judgment pursuant to N.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). [Emphasis added.]
3
Nev. R. Civ. Pro. 60 (b) provides: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) fraud ... [or] (3) the
judgment is void .... The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1) and (2)
not more than six months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. (Emphasis
in original.)
4
Nev. R. Civ. Pro. 55(b)(2) states: If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the
action, he (or, if appearing by representative, his representative) shall be served with written notice of the
application for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such application.
5
Lindblom v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 90 P.3d 1283, 1285, n. 7 (Nev. 2004).
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Lindblom entered default on August 28, 2001. A default judgment was obtained on
September 10, 2001, without notice to either Prime or its insurer. There was no record of
interaction between Lindblom and Prime or its insurer between commencement of the action
and entry of default. No further contact occurred between the parties until Lindblom initiated
collection proceedings in April 2002.
Prime and its insurer immediately moved to set aside the default judgment as void
under NRCP 60(b)(3) and NRCP 55(b)(2) for Lindblom’s failure to provide three-days’
notice of the hearing on the application for entry of default judgment. However, Prime’s
motion was filed more than six months from the date of the entry of default judgment. The
district court declined to afford relief based on lack of notice, but granted Prime’s motion
under NRCP 60(b)(1), on the basis of excusable neglect. Lindblom timely filed an appeal
from the order setting aside the default judgment.
In an opinion by Nevada Supreme Court Justice A. William Maupin, the court
affirmed the district court’s order setting aside the default judgment holding: (1) an order
setting aside a default judgment was appealable as a special order; (2) even though the trial
court’s finding of excusable neglect under Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 60(b)(2)
was not a proper basis upon which to grant relief from the default judgment, the trial court’s
exercise of discretion to deny or grant a motion to set aside a default judgment under NRCP
60(b)(1) on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect will not be
disturbed upon appeal, absent an abuse of discretion; (3) the default judgment should have
been rendered void under NRCP 60(b)(3) for Appellant’s failure to provide Respondent with
the three-days’ written notice of hearings on the application for default judgment, as required
under NRCP 55(b)(2). A default judgment entered without notice when notice to defendant
is required is void; (4) for policy reasons and consistency with other jurisdictions, the court
extended its earlier holding in Christy v. Carlisle6 that the hotel’s participation in pre-suit
negotiations equated to an “appearance” under NRCP 55(b)(2) and that three-days’ written
notice was required when pre-suit interactions evinced a clear intent to appear and defend.7
Discussion
The primary issue in this case was whether a defendant’s participation in pre-suit
negotiations constituted an “appearance” and entitled the defendant to receive written notice
of default proceedings required under NRCP 55(b)(2). Secondary issues included whether
an order setting aside a default judgment was appealable and the proper basis for granting the
motion to set aside the default judgment.
The court disagreed with Prime’s argument that an order setting aside default
judgment was not an appealable order. The court stated that an order setting aside a default
judgment was appealable as a special order under NRAP 3A(b)(2), if the motion to set aside
was made more than sixty days after entry of the default judgment under NRCP 60(b)(1).8
The motion in this case was made eight months after the entry of default and, thus,
appealable as a special order.
The court stated a trial court’s exercise of discretion to grant or deny motions to set
aside a default judgment on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect under NRCP 60(b)(1) would not be disturbed on appeal, absent an abuse of
discretion. Motions to set aside default judgments under NRCP 60(b)(1) must be filed within
6

Christy v. Carlisle, 584 P.2d 687, 689 (Nev. 1978).
Lindblom v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 90 P.3d 1283, 1285, n. 7 (Nev. 2004).
8
Citing Kokkos v. Tsalikis, 530 P.2d 756 (Nev. 1975) (holding that an order setting aside entry of default was
not appealable under NRAP 3A). (Emphasis in original.) See also Nev. R. App. Pro. 3A(b)(2), supra, note 2.
7
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six months after entry of the judgment.9 Under NRCP 60(b)(3), the six-month time limit
does not apply if the default judgment is void for some reason.10
On the issue of whether pre-suit interactions constituted an appearance, the court
extended its prior holding in Christy11 to equate pre-suit negotiations with an appearance
under NRCP 55(b)(2). Thus, three days’ written notice to defendants of hearings on
applications for default judgments under NRCP 55(b)(2) were required when pre-suit
interactions envinced a clear intent to appear and defend. This conclusion was consistent
with other jurisdictions.12 Default judgments were only available when an essentially
nonresponsive party halted the adversarial process. Given the extensive settlement
negotiations between the parties prior to filing legal action, the short time period between the
deadline for appearance and the entry of default, and Prime’s promptness in referring the
matter to its insurer and seeking relief, the court could not conclude that Prime or its insurer
had abandoned or ignored the proceedings. The court held that Prime’s participation in the
pre-suit negotiations constituted an appearance and Prime was thus entitled to written notice
of the default judgment proceeding. Appellant’s failure to give the written three-day notice
rendered the default judgment void.
The court concluded the district court improperly set aside the default judgment for
excusable neglect under NRCP 60(b)(1). The motion was filed more than six months after
the default judgment. However, Prime originally asked for relief under NRCP 60(b)(3) and
the default judgment was void for lack of notice. Thus, the district court should have
considered the voidness argument.
Conclusion
The pre-suit interactions between Lindblom and Prime’s insurer constituted an
appearance under NRCP 55(b)(2). Appellant’s failure to give Prime three-days’ written
notice of the hearings on the default judgment rendered the judgment void and subject to
motions to set aside under NRCP 60(b)(3). Although improvidently based, the district court
did not abuse its discretion to grant Prime’s motion. For all these reasons, the district court’s
order setting aside the default judgment was affirmed.
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Supra, note 3.
Id.
11
Supra, note 6.
12
Lindblom, 90 P.3d, at 1285, n. 7.
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